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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Raising the Contributory Negligence Issue
A majority of American jurisdictions have sustained the proposition
that the issue of contributory negligence may be properly raised by an af-
firmative plea.1 Moreover, the courts of these jurisdictions have made
statements to the effect that contributory negligence is an affirmative de-
fense which must be specially pleaded.2
1 Railway Exp. Agency, Inc. v. Mallory, 168 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.), cert. dented 335
U.S. 824, 69 Sup. Ct. 48 (1948); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Maddox, 236 Ala. 594,
183 So. 849 (1938); Lutfy v. Lockhart, 37 Ariz. 488, 295 Pac. 975 (1931);
Martinelli v. Poley, 210 Cal. 450, 292 Pac. 451 (1930); Bragdon v. Hexter, 86
Colo. 435, 282 Pac. 568 (1929); Cline v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628
(1939); Universal Credit Co. v. Service Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 69 Ga. App.
357, 25 S.E.2d 526 (1943); Madron v. McCoy, 63 Idaho 703, 126 P.2d 566
(1942); Henderson v. National Mutual Casualty Co., 164 Kan. 109, 187 P.2d 508
(1947); French v. T.S.C. Motor Freight Lines, 39 So.2d 363 (La. App. 1949);
Collins v. Croteau, 322 Mass. 291, 77 N.E.2d 305 (1948); Gerber v. Schutte In-
vestment Co., 354 Mo. 1246, 194 S.W.2d 25 (1946); McCartan v. Park Butte
Theater Co., 103 Mont. 342, 62 P.2d 338 (1936); Tempel v. Proffett, 122 Neb.
249, 240 N.W 285 (1932); Dragan v. Grossman, 116 N. J. Law 182, 182 Ad. 848,
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd 117 N. J. Law 147, 187 Ad. 373 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936); George
v. Jensen, 49 N.M, 410, 165 P.2d 129 (1946); Dalrymple v. Sinkoe, 230 N.C. 453,
53 S.E.2d 437 (1949); G.A. Nichols Co. v. Lockhart, 191 Okla. 296, 129 P.2d 599
(1942); Lawrence v. Southern Ry., 169 S.C. 1, 167 S.E. 839 (1933); Pollari v.
Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 25, 176 P.2d 111 (1947); Hart v. Clapp, 185 Wash. 362,
54 P.2d 1012 (1936) Some states have statutory provisions to the effect that con-
tributory negligence must be pleaded. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 21-406 (1939); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-139 (1943); N.H. REv. LAWS, c. 384, § 13 (1942); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-112 (1950) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires an affirma-
tive pleading of contributory negligence. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Where contribu-
tory negligence is pleaded affirmatively it has generally been held that facts consti-
tuting such negligence must be set forth. Pankey v. City of Mobile, 250 Ala. 566,
35 So.2d 497 (1948); Preston v. Hubbell, 87 Cal. App.2d 53, 196 P.2d 113
(1948); McLeod Construction Co. v. Cooper, 101 Fla. 441, 134 So. 224 (1931);
Quatray v. Wicker, 16 La.App. 515, 134 So. 313 (1931); Waller v. Hill, 183 Ore.
53, 190 P.2d 147 (1948) A Nevada case holds that the defendant must plead
contributory negligence with the same particularity required of the plaintiff in plead-
ing negligence. Wells, Inc. v. Shoemake, 64 Nev. 57, 177 P.2d 451 (1947) On
the other hand, the federal courts have held that a simple plea that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence is sufficient and that contributory negligence need
be pleaded only well enough to inform the plaintiff that it is to be relied upon as a
defense. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Napoli, 166 F.2d 24 (5th Cit. 1948);
Sharp v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 1 F.R.D. 16 (D.NJ. 1939) Ken-
tucky requires only a general allegation of contributory negligence. Nelson's Adm x.
v. Southern Ry., 302 Ky. 243, 194 S.W.2d 518 (1946); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Smith, 101 Ky. 104, 39 S.W 832 (1897) In any event, the pleading need not
be labeled as a contributory negligence plea. Friddle v. Southern Pac. Co., 126 Cal.
App. 388, 14 P.2d 568 (1932); Dragan v. Grossman, 182 Ad. 848, (Sup. Cr.),
a4f'd 117 N. J. Law 147, 187 Ad. 373 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936).
'Cases cited note 1 supra. If taken without qualification, the statements referred
to are likely to lead to the mistaken condusion that contributory negligence can
never become an issue except by affirmative pleading. The Supreme Court of Utah
has properly expressed the rule by holding that there must be an affirmative plead-
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In a few jurisdictions the issue may be raised by a general denial. How-
ever, in these jurisdictions there are usually particular reasons why the de-
fense need not be affirmatively pleaded3 For instance, in Wisconsin the
doctrine of comparative negligence permits the defense to be raised under
a denial.4 A few other jurisdictions require the plaintiff to plead his own
freedom from negligence and, therefore, hold that a denial puts contributory
negligence in issue.5
It may be inferred from statements of courts adhering to the majority
rule that contributory negligence must be specially pleaded if it is to be
available as a defense in any instance. However, the issue may be tendered
by the pleadings in manners other than by responsive pleading. A majority
of American courts have held that a demurrer will raise the issue of con-
tributory negligence if the plaintiff's negligence appears on the face of the
petition.6
Where the affirmative plea of the contributory negligence is required
it is generally held that it admzts the defendant's negligence and seeks to
ing if the issue is to be tendered by responsive pleading. Pollari v. Salt Lake City,
111 Utah 25, 176 P.2d 111 (1947) As for manners in which the issue may be
tendered, see page - nfra.
'Greenberg v. Branciere, 100 Conn. 596, 124 Atl. 216 (1924); Cole v. Wilson, 127
Me. 316, 143 Ad. 178 (1928); Sr. Anthony Falls Power Co. v. Eastman, 20 Minn.
277 (1882); Harper v. Holcomb, 146 Wis. 183, 130 N.W 1133 (1911); Jones
v. Sheboygan & Fond du Lac RR., 42 Wis. 307 (1877).
"WIs. STAT. § 270.28 (1947). In Wisconsin it is held that the question of the
plaintiff's negligence must be submitted to the jury notwithstanding the fact that
the defendant has failed to plead it. Arneson v. Buggs, 231 Wis. 499, 286 N.W
19 (1939). However, in Mississippi, where the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence also has been adopted, it has been held that the defendant must specifically
plead contributory negligence or ask an instruction on it in order to take advantage
of the statute. MIss. STAT. § 1454 (1942); Moore v. Abdalla, 197 Miss. 125, 19
So.2d 502 (1944); Gulf & S.I.RL.R v. Saucier, 139 Miss. 497, 104 So. 180 (1925).
'Cole v. Wilson, 127 Me. 316, 143 Ad. 178 (1928); Greenberg v. Branciere, 100
Conn. 596, 124 Ad. 216 (1924); St. Anthony Falls Power Co. v. Eastman, 20 Minn.
277 (1882). Of the courts which require plaintiff to show his freedom from
negligence some have required an express negation in the complaint. McDermott
v. A.B.C. Oil Burner Sales Corp., 266 Ill. App. 115 (1932); Fitzpatrick v. Inter-
national Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929); Sylcord v. Horn, 179 Iowa 936,
162 N.W 249 (1917). Others have viewed the allegation of defendant's negli-
gence as a sufficient negation. Greenberg v. Branciere, supra; Harper v. Holcomb,
supra; St. Anthony Falls Power Co. v. Eastman, supra. Where either an express or
an implied negation is required as an essential part of the pleading, it would appear
that a general denial would raise the issue. Greenberg v. Branciere, supra; Sylcord
v. Horn, supra. However, one Minnesota case declares that the plaintiff must have
negatived his fault expressly in order for a denial to raise the issue. Hill v. Min-
neapolis St. Ry., 112 Minn. 503, 128 N.W 831 (1910).
'Cline v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628 (1939); Henderson v. National Mutual
Casualty Co., 164 Kan. 109, 187 P.2d 508 (1949); Atherton v. Goodwin, 163 Kan.
22, 180 P.2d 296 (1947); Mating v. City of Billings, 115 Mont. 249, 142 P.2d 361
(1943); Ramsey v. Nash Furniture Co., 209 N.C. 165, 183 S.E. 536 (1936); Flat-
man v. Lulay Bros. Lumber Co., 175 Ore. 495, 154 P.2d 535 (1944).
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avoid liability by showing that the plaintiff was also chargeable with negli-
gence and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury.7
An admission of negligence imposes no undue burden on the defendant
who recognizes the fact that he was negligent, and, therefore, realizes that
he must rely on the doctrine of contributory negligence in order to defeat
the plaintiff's claim. However, the very nature of the accident from which
a negligence action arises is often such that the defendant cannot honestly
state that he was or was not negligent. The requirement of an affirmative
plea of contributory negligence raises the possibility that an innocent de-
fendant will be required to admit that he was negligent in order to preserve
his right to defend on the ground of contributory negligence.
In England, the Statute of 4 Anne, Chapter 16, Section 4, permits the
defendant to set forth in his answer as many defenses as he has. Similar
statutes have been enacted in many United States jurisdictions., In the
absence of abrogation by statute, it would appear that the provisions of the
Statute of 4 Anne are part of the common law in the United States by
virtue of its enactment before the Constitution.9 Consequently, were it not
for other considerations, it would appear that a defendant might enter a
general denial and an affirmative plea of contributory negligence in the
same answer. However, the rule permitting multiple defense pleading
has been limited by the rule that the several defenses must be consistent.10
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have solved the difficulty by granting
the defendant the right to plead as many defenses as he has regardless of
consistency, as long as the defenses are'separately stated. 1
TShayne v. Saunders, 129 Fla. 355, 176 So. 495 (1937); Saks v. Eichel, 167 So.
464 (La. App. 1936); Howard v. Rowan, 154 So. 382 (La. App. 1934); Reed v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 171 Md. 115, 188 Ad. 15 (1936); Cain v.
Wintersteen, 144 Mo. App. 1, 128 S.W 274 (1910); Birsch v. Citizens Electric Co.,
36 Mont. 574, 93 Pac. 940 (1908); Thayer v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 21 N.M. 330,
154 Pac. 691 (1916); Cogdell v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 132 N.C. 852, 44 S.E.
618 (1903); Armstrong v. Green, 113 Okla. 254, 241 Pac. 789 (1925); Colonial
Refining Co. v. Lathrop, 64 Okla. 47, 166 Pac. 747 (1917). California appears
to have repudiated the doctrine that a plea of contributory negligence is an unquali-
fied admission of negligence on defendant's part. "Among the authorities in Cali-
fornia and in some other states the careless use of a familiar term has occasionally
led to the inaccurate statement that the doctrine of contributory negligence is a plea
of confession and avoidance." Hoffman v. Southern Pac. Co., 84 Cal. App. 337,
347, 258 Pac. 397, 401 (1927).
"E.g. IDAHO CODE § 5-616 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 110, § 167 (Smith-Hurd,
1948); MITNN. STAT. ANN. § 544.06 (1947); TENN. CODE § 8759 (Williams,
1934).
SKINNANE, ANGLO AMIRIcAN LAW 327 (1932)
"To permit a defendant to deny negligence on one hand and to admit negligence on
the other raises an obvious question of consistency.
'FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e). New Mexico has also repudiated the consistency rule.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-101 (8) (1941)
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In some jurisdictions the question of the inconsistency of a general
denial and a plea of contributory negligence has been avoided by the device
of alternative and hypothetical pleading.12 The courts in these jurisdictions
have reasoned.variously that a hypothetical plea of contributory negligence
admits negligence only for the "purpose of the plea,"' that it admits the
defendanes negligence but "is a denial of such negligence being the pro-
ducing cause,"'14 and that it admits only "that there is an issue"'" of the de-
fendant's negligence.
Even in jurisdictions which have stated that a pleading of contributory
negligence must be in the affirmative it is widely held that the defendant
may have the benefit of the issue if contributory negligence appears from
the evidence adduced by the plaintiff."' In such instances the courts have
generally refused to allow the defendant to introduce additional evidence of
the plaintiff's negligence.17
Other courts have held that the contributory negligence issue may be
raised by the defendanes evidence if the plaintiff fails to object, even though
the defendant has failed to plead the defense1
, Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hall, 87 Ala. 708, 6 So. 277 (1888); Levenworth Light
& Heating Co. v. Waller, 65 Kan. 514, 70 Pac. 365 (1902). "A defendant may
deny that he was guilty of any negligence, and at the same time consistently claim
that, even if the jury should find that he has been negligent, the plaintiff would not
have sustained any injury if it had not been for his own negligence as a proximate
cause." Sheets v. Southern Par- Co., 212 Cal. 509, 515, 299 Pac. 71, 74 (1931).
'Crocker v. Johnston, 43 N.M. 469, 478, 95 P.2d 214, 220 (1939).
fBowen v. Kansas City, 140 Mo. App. 695, 698, 126 S.W 790, 791 (1910).
' Bomar v. Louisiana N. & S. R., 42 La. An. 1206, 1206, 9 So. 244, 245 (1890).
"Shipley v. Komer, 60 F.Supp. 551 (S.D. Fla. 1945); McIver v. Allen, 33 Ariz.
28, 262 Pac. 5 (1927); Curtis v. Castner, 220 Cal. 185, 30 P.2d 26 (1934); Dunn
Bus Service, Inc. v. McKinley, 130 Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1937); McCrackin v.
McKinney, 52 Ga. App. 519, 183 S.E. 831 (1936); Pipher v. Carpenter, 51 Idaho
548, 7 P.2d 589 (1932); Descombaz v. Klock, 59 S.D. 461, 240 N.W 495 (1932)
There seems to be some uncertainty as to just how conclusively the plaintiff's evi-
dence must show contributory negligence in order for the defendant to take advan-
tage of this method of raising the issue. A Missouri case holds that contributory
negligence must appear as an unavoidable conclusion. Norton v. St. Louis & Hanni-
bal Ry., 40 Mo. App. 642 (1890). A Montana case suggests that the evidence must
raise a presumption of the plaintiff's negligence. McCartan v. Park Butte Theater
Co., 103 Mont. 342, 62 P.2d 338 (1936). Other courts have held that contributory
negligence need appear only sufficiently to present an issue of fact for the jury.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. McCormick, 59 Fla. 121, 52 So. 712 (1910); Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. v. Cook, 18 Wyo. 43, 102 Pac. 657 (1909). A Missouri court of ap-
peals found justification for the rule that the issue may be raised by plaintiff's evi-
dence by reasoning that a plaintiff cannot complain that he has had no notice of or
opportunity to meet his own evidence. Wallower v. Webb City, 171 Mo. App. 214,
156 S.W 48 (1913).
' Crocker v. Johnston, 43 N.M. 469, 95 P.2d 214 (1939); Konig v. Nevada-Cali-
fornia-Oregon Ry., 36 Nev. 181, 135 Pac. 141 (1913).
'Moeller v. Packard, 86 Cal. App. 459, 261 Pac. 315 (1927); Chicago & Erie R.R.
19501
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
In Ohio, as in most other jurisdictions, the issue of contributory negli-
gence may be raised by an affirmative pleading.19 In fact, in a majority of
the Ohio decisions the courts have stated that contributory negligence is
an affirmative defense which must be specially pleaded.2" On the other
hand, in a few Ohio cases there are statements to the effect that contribu-
tory negligence need not be specially pleaded. 21 However, the cases which
state that an affirmative pleading is not required involved circumstances in
which evidence of the plaintiff's negligence was introduced without objec-
tion. The courts can easily clarify the situation by stating that the defense
must be specially pleaded if it is to be raised by the pleadings, but that it
need not be pleaded in any manner if adduced by the evidence without
objection."
A requirement of affirmative pleading, of course, nullifies the possi-
bility of raising the issue of contributory negligence by a denial. However,
two Ohio cases have permitted the issue to be raised by a denial where the
plaintiff in his petition alleged his own freedom from negligence.23 Not-
withstanding the fact that these two cases have not been expressly over-
ruled, they do not represent the law in Ohio. Later decisions have dearly
repudiated the doctrine by holding that the allegation of freedom from
negligence is immaterial to the complaint - and that the issue of the plain-
tiff's negligence is not, therefore, raised by a denial.
2 5
v. Monesmith, 110 Ind. App. 281, 37 N.E.2d 724 (1941); Robinson v. Kansas
City Public Service Co., 345 Mo. 764, 137 S.W.2d 548 (1940)
19Valencic v. The Akron & B.B.R.R., 133 Ohio St. 287, 13 N.E.2d 240 (1938),
Bradley v. Cleveland Ry., 112 Ohio St. 35, 146 N.E. 805 (1925); Kolp v. Stevens,
45 Ohio App. 147, 186 N.E. 821 (1933); Lopa v. Smith, 37 Ohio App. 346, 174
N.E. 258 (1930); Sharp v. Russell, 37 Ohio App. 306, 174 N.E. 617 (1930);
Sikora v. Bauer, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 530 (Ct. App. 1930); Dioguardi v. Ruby, 7 Ohio
L. Abs. 730 Ct.App. 1929; Armleder v. Cincinnati, 16 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 180
(1905). In Ohio the defendant who pleads contributory negligence affirmatively
must set forth the facts upon which his daim is founded. Vanatta v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R., 4 Ohio N.P (N.S.) 542 (1906) In this respect Ohio follows the
general rule. Cases cited note 1 supra.
=oCases cited note 19 supra.
21Gottesman v. City of Cleveland, 142 Ohio St. 410, 52 N.E.2d 644 (1944); Rohr,
Adm r. v. The Scioto Valley Traction Co., 12 Ohio App. 275 1920; Martz v. Floral
Products Co., 17 Ohio L. Abs. 118 (Ct. App. 1934)
" Introduction of the issue by the evidence is discussed wfra.
'Coal Company v. Estievenard, 53 Ohio St. 43, 40 N.E. 725 (1895); Dussell v.
Akron St. Ry., 8 Ohio N.P. 622 (1891), aff'd 52 Ohio St. 649 44 N.E. 1148
(1895).
'Street Ry. v. Nolthenius, 40 Ohio St. 376 (1883); McGoldrick v. Kuebler, 36
Ohio App. 380, 172 N.E. 679 (1930); Peat v. City of Norwalk, 5 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
614 (1903); Hill v. Lake Shore & M.S.Ry., 22 Ohio C.C. 291 (1901); Streit v.
L. Hoster Brewing Co., 12 Ohio Dec. 619 (1902); Voss v. Young, 9 Ohio Dec.
Repr. 48(1883) But cf. Toomey v. Avery Stamping Co., 20 Ohio C.C. 183
(1900) (negativing knowledge that machinery was in defective condition).
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In Ohio, as in other states where it is stated that contributory negligence
is required to be specially pleaded, the issue may be raised in manners other
than responsive pleading. For instance, if the plaintiff's petition indicates
his own culpable negligence, a demurrer will raise the issue.26
Under the Ohio decisions to the effect that contributory negligence is an
affirmative defense,27 a defendant is faced with the same difficulty en-
countered by defendants in other jurisdictions which take that position.2 8
His plea acts as an admission of his own negligence.2" In addition, al-
though Section 11315 of the Ohio General Code allows a defendant to
plead as many defenses as he has, provided that those defenses are consistent,
the consistency provision would appear to nullify the possibility of the
defendant's including a general denial and a plea of contributory negligence
in the same answer. However, in most instances the Ohio courts have
been liberal in demanding only consistency in fact rather than consistency
by implication of law." Consequently, many Ohio courts have permitted
a defendant to plead hypothetically 3 although there is no code provision
expressly authorizing such a plea.
' Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Stephens, 75 Ohio St. 171, 79 N.E. 235 (1906);
Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Forrest, 73 Ohio St. 1, 75 N.E. 818 (1905); Armleder
v. Cincinnati, 16 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 180 (1905); Nellis v. Cincinnati Traction Co.,
3 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 527 (1905),rev'd on other grounds, 81 Ohio St. 535 (1909).
In New Jersey, even though it is stated that a defendant is required to plead con-
tributory negligence affirmatively, it is held that a denial will raise the issue where
the plaintiff has alleged freedom from negligence. Devoe v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R.,
112 N.J. Law 35 169 Atl. 637 (1933); Titus v. Pennsylvania R.R., 87 N.J. Law
157, 92 Atd. 944 (1915).
'McGoldrick v. Kuebler, 36 Ohio App. 380, 172 N.E. 679 (1930) (the issue is
raised if petition merely suggests an inference of negligence); Orlinkowski v.
Glowik, 22 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 266 (1908) (if it raise a presumption); Wehrenberg
v. The Cincinnati Traction Co., 2 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 271 (1904) (if it suggests the
inference).
"Cases cited note 17 supra.
"See page supra.
"Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851 (1946); Bradley
v. Cleveland Ry., 112 Ohio St. 35, 146 N.E. 805 (1925); Hoyer v. Lake Shore
Electric Ry., 104 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E. 627 (1922); Cincinnati Traction Co. v.
Forrest, 73 Ohio St. 1, 75 N.E. 818 (1905); Kolp v. Stevens, 45 Ohio App. 147,
186 N.E. 821 (1933); Bakas v. Casparis Stone Co., 14 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 577
(1913).
"Lichtenstein v. Hudepohl Brewing Co., 11 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 441 (1908); Mc-
Caskey Register Co. v. American Case & Register Co., 8 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 415
(1909).
" Scarinzi v. Farkas, 80 Ohio App. 409, 75 N.E.2d 86 (1947); Thomas v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 70 Ohio App. 191, 45 N.E.2d 776 (1942); Lemon v. Wiltberger, 2
Ohio L. Abs. 123 (Ct. App. 1923); Bakas v. Casparis Stone Co., 14 Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 577 (1913); Nellis v. Cincinnati, D. & T. Traction Co., 3 Ohio N.P. (N.S.)
527 (1905), rev'd on other grounds, 81 Ohio St. 535 (1909); Latham v. Columbus
Ry. & Light Co., 19 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 333 (1909); Finn v. Cincinnati, Milfard &
1950]
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The desirability of hypothetical pleading from the standpoint of the
defendant in a negligence action is unquestionable. The device enables him
to rely on the defense of contributory negligence if it develops that such
is his true and proper defense, but requires the plaintiff to sustain the
burden of proof on the issue of negligence even in such a case. Moreover,
the advantages of alternative and hypothetical pleadings are unlimited from
the standpoint of efficient administration of justice. As was stated in one
Ohio case:
3 2
It is certainly not consistent with the spirit and intention of the code
that a party having one or the other of two good defenses, without the
means of knowing, otherwise than from the developments to be made upon
the trial, which of the two, in fact or in law, is his true defense, shall, at his
peril, be compelled to elect in advance on which he will rely, to the exclu-
sion of the other. When from the nature of the case, it is rendered un-
certain which of two grounds of defense is his true and proper one, it is
competent for the defendant in his answer to set them both up, provided
they will admit of being stated in such form that the answer can be sworn
to without falsehood, and in good faith.
Undoubtedly, alternative and hypothetical pleading has greatly mim-
mized the importance of the consistency rule in Ohio, but still it has not
solved the problem of raising the issue of contributory negligence. The
Ohio courts have held that the defense of contributory negligence may be
raised by the evidence as well as by the pleadings. This is true whether
the plaintiff's own evidence raises a presumption or inference of negligence
on his part 3 or whether the defendant introduces evidence of the plaintiff's
negligence without pleading it affirmatively and the plaintiff fails to
object.3"
Loveland Traction Co., 7 Ohio L. Rep. 76 (1909); Lichtenstein v. Hudepohl Brew-
ing Co., 11 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 441 (1908) However, the pleading must be worded
conditionally. Bakas v. Casparis Stone So., supra; Fruckey v. West, 12 Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 45 (1911); Ellison v. Pullman Co., 7 Ohio L. Rep. 330 (1909); Finn v.
Cincinnati, Milford & Loveland Traction Co., supra; Lichtenstein v. Hudepohl Brew-
ing Co., supra. Defendant's negligence is not admitted in conditional pleadings.
Scarinzi v. Farkas, supra.
"'Fruckey v. West, 30 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 484, 487 (1911)
'Marsh v. Koons, 78 Ohio St. 68, 84 N.E. 599 (1908) (where it raises a pre-
sumption of negligence on plaintiff's part); Thompson v. Kerr, 39 Ohio L. Abs.
113, 51 N.E.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1942) (presumption or inference); Kinney v.
Schmidt, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 582 (Ct. App. 1932) (inference); City of Cincinnati v.
Frazer, 18 Ohio C.C. 50 (1899) (presumption); see Thomas v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
70 Ohio App. 191, 45 N.E.2d 776 (1942) (presumption) The courts have made
various statements as to the degree of proof necessary to remove the effect of this
evidence. Thomas v. Pennsylvania Ry., supra (the proof must remove the pre-
sumption); Thompson v. Kerr, supra (such proof as is sufficient to equal or counter-
balance the presumption); Kinney v. Schmidt, supra (the proof must counterbal-
ance the inference of contributory negligence by a fair consideration of all the evi-
dence); Cincinnati v. Frazer, supra (burden on plaintiff to remove the presumption
of contributory negligence)
" McKinnon v. Pettibone, 44 Ohio App. 147, 184 N.E.707, aff'd 125 Ohio St.
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Defense attorneys, ever mindful of the importance of court room
psychology and of the value of maintaining their clients in positions above
reproach, are reluctant to admit negligence even hypothetically. 5 Thus,
there developed among Ohio defense attorneys the practice of entering a
denial in the same answer with a plea to the effect that the injury, if any, was
occasioned solely and proximately by the negligence of the plaintiff.30
Many defense attorneys thought that the advantages of the sole negli-
gence plea were twofold. In the first place, they realized that it would
enable them to insert in the pleadings a statement which, because of its
effect on the jury, might prove very damaging to the plaintiff's case. Sec-
ondly, they thought such a plea essential to the introduction of evidence on
the issue of the plaintiff's sole negligence.37
It is true that in Ohio, if the defendant is allowed to introduce evidence
that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury,
then, even if it appears from the defendant's evidence merely that the evi-
dence of each was the proximate cause, the case is considered a proper one
for application of the doctrine of contributory negligence.3 8 But it also
605, 183 N.E.786 (1932); Osseforth v. The Cincinnati Traction Co., 9 Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 360 (1910) (however, this court demanded an amendment of the pleading
to conform with the proof before an instruction on contributory negligence would
be given).
The adversary system is another reason for this reluctance. Unfortunately, the de-
fense attorney feels it is his duty to compel the plaintiff to prove every material al-
legation even though he knows that the facts which plaintiff has alleged are true.
' Glass v. Win. Heffran Co., 86 Ohio St. 70, 98 N.E. 923 (1912); Van Duzen Gas
& Gasoline Engine Co. v. Schelies, 61 Ohio St. 298, 55 N.E. 998 (1899); The
Springfield Gas Co. v. Herman, 46 Ohio App. 309, 188 N.E. 733 (1933); Mc-
Kinnon v. Pettibone, 44 Ohio App. 147, 184 N.E. 707 (1932); Nier v. Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co., 19 Ohio L. Abs. 281 (Ct. App. 1935); Jones v. Garfield,
14 Ohio L. Abs. 145 (Ct. App. 1932); Wuest v. Cincinnati, 13 Ohio N.P. (N.S.)
249 (1912). The defendant does not assume the burden of proof by pleading sole
negligence. Montanari v. Haworth, 108 Ohio St. 8(1923); Springfield Gas Co. v.
Herman, supra; Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Adams, 33 Ohio App. 311, 169 N.E. 480
(1929). This plea has found favor in some foreign jurisdictions. Dragan v. Gross-
man, 116 N.J. Law 182, 182 Adt. 848 (1936); Wallace v. Portland Ry. Light &
Power Co., 103 Ore. 68, 71, 204 Pac. 147, 149 (1917) " It seems absurd to say
that while, under a plea that plaintiffs negligence was partly the cause of the acci-
dent, defendant may offer proof and have an instruction upon the theory of con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff, yet if he goes a step further, and pleads that
the plaintiff's negligence was wholly the proximate cause, his testimony to the effect
that it was partly the cause must be disregarded."
' However, as is seen snfra p. - , the "sole negligence" plea is surplusage and,
therefore, should in no way govern the admissibility of evidence.
'Rayland Coal Co. v. McFadden, 90 Ohio St. 183, 107 N.E. 330 (1914); Behm
v. Cincinnati, D. & T. Traction Co., 86 Ohio St. 209, 99 N.E. 383 (1912); Glass
v. Win. Heffron Co., 86 Ohio St. 70, 98 N.E. 923 (1912); Kramer v. Blake, 18
Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 77(1910). The evidence offered by the defendant will seldom
be sufficient to show the sole negligence of the plantiff to the extent that reason-
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has been held that a plea of sole negligence "adds nothing"'39 to a general
denial, that it is mere "surplusage,"40 and that it will be stricken on timely
motion by the plaintiff.41 As a basis for such a holding the courts have
reasoned that a defendant need not plead that negligence of the plaintiff or
of a third party was solely responsible for the injury, for a defense of that
nature tends to disprove the defendant's culpable negligence, and is, there-
fore, admissible under a denial.4
2
On the one hand it has been held that, where a defendant alleges that
the injury was a result of the plaintiff's sole negligence, but falls short of
proving the allegation, he is entitled to an instruction on contributory negli-
gence.13 On the other hand it has been held that the sole negligence plea
accomplishes nothing.44 It follows that evidence of the plaintiff's sole negli-
gence must be admissible under the denial portion of the answer. The
practical effect of the Ohio decisions is that the defendant who wishes to
assure himself of the availability of the defense of contributory negligence
need only deny the plaintiff's allegations.
Thus, in Ohio defendants have an unwarranted advantage in raising the
issue of contributory negligence. The basic injustice of the situation lies
in the fact that the plaintiff may never be advised by the pleadings that he
is to meet a defense consisting of new matter which has not been pleaded.
One Ohio case4 5 has even gone so far as to indicate that it is not necessary
for the plaintiff to be forewarned of the defense of contributory negligence.
able minds cannot disagree on the point. Thus, the possibility of contributory
negligence ordinarily must be charged upon by the judge.
'Babcock v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 42 Ohio L. Abs. 271, 274, 60 N.E.2d
495, 497 (Ct. App. 1944).
4 Smith v. Thorns, 55 Ohio App. 174, 176, 9 N.E.2d 172, 173 (1936); Cincinnati
St. Ry. v. Adams, 33 Ohio App. 311, 314, 169 N.E. 480, 482 (1929); Behrens v.
Warrick, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 437, 443 (Ct. App. 1940); Goldstein v. Klein, 11 Ohio
N.P. (N.S.) 1, 8 (1911); Latham v. Columbus Ry. & Light Co., 19 Ohio Dec.
(N.P.) 333, 335 (1909).
Gottesman v. City of Cleveland, 46 Ohio L. Abs. 474, 70 N.E.2d 149 (1946)
"Taylor v. City of Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E.2d 724 (1944); Augusta
v. Paradis, 61 Ohio App. 323, 22 N.E.2d 578 (1939); Smith v. Thorns, 55 Ohio
App. 174, 9 N.E.2d 172 (1936); Babcock v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 42
Ohio L. Abs. 271, 60 N.E.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1944); Behrens v. Warrick, 32 Ohio
L. Abs. 437 (Ct. App. 1940); Gotterman v. Bohm, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 69 (Ct. App.
1935); Nier v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 19 Ohio L. Abs. 281 (Ct. App.
1935); Haylett v. McCreary, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 550 (Ct. App. 1932); Goldstein v.
Klein, 11 Ohio N.P (N.S.) 1 (1911); Latham v. The Columbus Ry. & Light Co.,
8 Ohio N.P (N.S.) 185 (1909); Fruckey v. West, 30 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 484
(1911); Cincinnati, D. & T. Traction Co. v. Sanders, 22 Ohio C. Dec. 413 (1909).
4'See note 37 supra.
Cases cited note 41 supra.
"Martz v. Floral Products Co., 17 Ohio L. Abs. 118, 123 (Ct. App. 1934).
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